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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Criminal Law-The Right of the State to Appeal in Criminal Cases
I. INTRODUCTION
The arguments against allowing a governmental authority to
appeal in criminal cases are founded on historical experience. The
early kings of England defined criminality and persecuted those who
opposed them.' They ordered the lords, barons, or others owing
allegiance to them to sound the "hue and cry" and arrest these
criminals in their name.' The prosecution of the criminal proceeded
under the watchful eye and guidance of the Crown in courts subject
to its influence.3
Two great abuses arose from this system of law enforcement.
The King, having the authority to make the laws and determine
which individuals were criminals, often failed to make that determi-
nation on the basis of social benefit or welfare. He could name as
criminals those subjects who were objectionable to him personally
and ignore social considerations. The other great danger in this
scheme was the possibility of repeated attempts by the Crown to gain
a conviction of the accused for his alleged offense irrespective of his
actual guilt or innocence. This process of multiple trials is modern-
ly recognized by the name "double jeopardy." The basis of double
jeopardy is the possibility that the accused, found innocent by his
peers, could have the facts of his case redetermined on the request
of the State.4
These early abuses led, in part, to the signing of the Magna
Carta5 which established that the government was below the law
I POOLE, DOMESDAY BOOK TO MAGNA CARTA 385-87 (1951).
2 PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 378 (2d ed.
1936) ; Poole, op. cit. supra note 1, at 10, 392 (1951) ; PouND & PLUCKNETT,
HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF THE COMMON LAW 55-61 (3d ed. 1927).
8 PLUCKNETT, op. cit. sipra note 2, at 82-86.
'Double jeopardy means the defendant is twice put in danger of convic-
tion for the same offense. State v. Watson, 209 N.C. 229, 183 S.E. 286
(1935). This could occur in several ways. An accused could be tried
repeatedly for the same offense in the trial courts. He could be convicted,
pay his penalty, and then be retried. Or he could be tried in a lower court
and carried to appellate courts by the Crown until he was convicted. The
rule of double jeopardy prohibits a second punishment for a single offense as
well as a second trial even if the defendant has never received punishment.
Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904).
5 Poole, op. cit. supra note 1, at 477. The Magna Carta was signed at
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and not above it. Thus, the rule developed that the Crown could
not, on its own motion, appeal criminal cases to a higher court.'
This restriction was absolute and barred appeals regardless of ques-
tions of double jeopardy. The idea that no person shall be twice
put in jeopardy for the same offense was carried over to the colonies
and remains a sacred principle in American criminal law. It is
expressed in our various constitutions7 and is recognized in every
court.
8
The dangers of persecution that existed under the kings are
still present to some degree under our representative form of gov-
ernment. The state retains both the power to enact the law and the
authority to enforce it, but due to improvements, both organizational
and social, these dangers are not imminent. Organizationally, these
improvements are found in the governmental doctrine of separation
of powers. No longer does a single authority legislate criminal
codes, pursue the criminal and prosecute him at will. Social ad-
vances also play a large part in reducing harrassment of individuals.
The right to vote and better educational and communicative facili-
ties have made the more enlightened wishes of the people known to
government officials. Consequently many jurisdictions have seen
fit to allow the State to appeal in those criminal cases where questions
of double jeopardy do not arise.
No appeal involving only questions of law could amount to
double jeopardy. If the doctrine is interpreted as a bar to the right
of the State to" appeal in all criminal prosecutions, some obviously
guilty individuals might be released to plague society. These re-
leases would occur not because there was a possibility of double
jeopardy but because the State could not appeal its legal questions.
Logic demands that the law be correctly applied in criminal cases.
Runnynede in 1215 and reissued three times in the following three centuries.
Id. at 477-78.' "At common law, the state cannot appeal.... [W]hether an appeal or
writ of error will be at the instance of the state under the constitutional
provision as to double jeopardy would seem to depend on the construction
given to the provision by the court.... [T]he constitutional provisions
differ in different states. Some provide that no one shall be twice put in
jeopardy for the same offense; others that no one shall be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb .... [M]ost courts hold these phrases to be
synonymous, and to prohibit a second trial for any offense." CLARK, CRIM-
INALr PROCEDuRE 453 (2d ed. 1918).
"U.S. CoNsT. amend. V; N.C. CoxsT. art. I, § 17.
'As North Carolina has stated the rule, "No man shall be twice vexed
for the same offense." State v. West, 71 N.C. 263, 264 (1874). See also
State v. Credle, 63 N.C. 506 (1869) ; State v. Taylor, 8 N.C. 462 (1821).
[Vol. 42
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If an appeal by the State is required to get the correct application,
such appeal should be allowed. This thinking weighs heavily in some
states,9 less in others.' The trend in North Carolina has been to
allow a relatively small degree of appellate authority on behalf of
the State, limiting it to a few areas and refusing to grant appeal on
many questions of law. North Carolina holds dear the feeling that
the expansion of appellate powers of the State is action in an area,
where its ancestors feared to tread and that it should avoid such
action."
Early case law on the right of the State to appeal in North Caro-
lina was inconsistent. At first, there was an absolute right on the
part of the State to appeal." However, this power was eliminated
in the early case of State v. Jones"3 which held that the State had
absolutely no power of appeal. This strict rule remained in effect
for fifty years, from 1809 until 1859,14 at which time the supreme
court again reversed its opinion and granted a very limited appellate
power to the State.'5 During the ensuing years the court developed
'E.g., CoNN. GEN'. STAT. § 54-96 (1958). This section authorizes mo-
tions for new trials after acquittal. State v. Carabetta, 106 Conn. 114, 137
At. 394 (1927); State v. Lee, 65 Conn. 265, 30 Atl. 1110 (1894). CONN.
GENq. STAT. § 54-96 (1958) is phrased as follows: "Appeals from the rulings
and decisions of the superior court or of the court of common pleas, upon
all questions of law arising on the trial of criminal cases, may be taken by
the state, with the permission of the presiding judge, to the supreme court
of errors, in the same manner and to the same effect as if made by the
accused."
"0E.g., TEXAS CONST. art. 5, § 26 which allows no state appeal in
criminal cases.
"1 See State v. Savery, 126 N.C. 1083, 36 S.E. 22 (1900) where the
court adopted as its own the following words: "We think the ancient rule
of the common law has been sufficiently relaxed by our predecessors, and we
are unwilling to move a step further in the direction of discretion.... In
coming to this conclusion, we are aware that its effect may possibly be to turn
lose a bad man upon society, but it is better in the administration of law
[that] there should be an occasional instance of violence even to the sense
of public justice, than that a principle should be established which, in times of
civil commotion that may occur in the history of every country, would serve
as an engine of oppression in the hands of corrupt time-servers and irre-
sponsible judges to crush the liberties of the citizen." Id. at 1090-91, 36 S.E.
at 25.
"2 State v. McLelland, 1 N.C. 632 (1804); State v. Haddock, 3 N.C.
162 (1802).
- 5 N.C. 257 (1809).
1' Between 1809 and 1859 two recorded cases were decided concerning the
State's authority: State v. Taylor, 8 N.C. 462 (1821), which denied the
State's appeal and State v. Moore, 29 N.C. 228 (1847), which was deemed a
mistrial by the court and returned for venire de novo.
15 See State v. Barnes, 52 N.C. 20 (1859).
1964]
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the scope of that power through comprehensive case law'" until, by
1883, it had grown to encompass appeals by the State on most
questions of law which were apparent on the face of the record.
Not all questions of law could be appealed, but only those arising
from special verdicts, 17 verdicts upon demurrer of the defendant,' 8
upon motions to quash,1a and upon arrest of judgment.
2 0
II. STATUTORY RIGHT OF APPEAL BY THE STATE
In 1883, prompted either by its own conscience or by the growth
of the courts' power in determining the State's right to appeal, the
Assembly enacted a statute which codified the right.2 ' This codifica-
tion halted the growth of the power and put its control in the hands
of the legislature. This legislative control is exemplified by the
fact that the statute has remained almost unchanged since 1883.
Amendments have been made,2 2 but the resemblance between the
1883 case law and the present codification is evident : 2
"8 In 1869 it was decided the State had a "very small" right of appeal.
State v. Credle, 63 N.C. 506 (1869). In State v. Bailey, 65 N.C. 426, 427
(1871), it was stated that neither the State nor the defendant could appeal
from interlocutory judgments except in capital cases and serious misde-
meanors. Later came the statement that no appeal was allowed where a
general verdict of not guilty had been entered. State v. Freeman, 66 N.C.
647 (1872); State v. Phillips, 66 N.C. 646 (1872). Those errors of law
apparent on the face of the record were considered appealable. State v.
Bobbitt, 70 N.C. 81 (1874). In State v. West, 71 N.C. 263 (1874), the
defendant had been released because the trial judge ordered a verdict of
not guilty to be entered on the defendant's plea of former acquittal. The
solicitor appealed and the supreme court found that such a verdict was a
general verdict, and they could not accept the appeal unless it had been on
a special verdict.., State v. Powell, 86 N.C. 640 (1882); State v. Moore, 84 N.C. 724
(1881) ; State v. Padgett, 82 N.C. 544 (1880) ; State v. Lane, 78 N.C. 547
(1878).
18 State v. Powell, 86 N.C. 640 (1882); State v. Moore, 84 N.C. 724
(1881); State v. Swepson, 82 N.C. 541 (1880); State v. Lane, 78 N.C.
547 (1878).
" See note 18 supra.
20 See note 18 supra.
"N.C. CowsoL. STATS. § 4649 (1919); Revisal of 1905 § 3276; Code of
1883, § 1237. The attempt seems to have been made to write the 1883 case
law into statutory form.
" N.C. Sess. Laws 1945, ch. 701, which added N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-
179(5), (6) (1953).
" The original enactment N.C. Code of 1883, § 1237 read: "APPEAL BY
STATE; IN WHAT CASES RECOGNIZED. An appeal to the supreme court may
be taken by the state in the following cases, and no other. Where judgment
has been given for the defendant.
(1) Upon a special verdict;
(2) Upon a demurrer;
[Vol. 42
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§ 15-179. When State mzy Appeal.-An appeal to the Supreme
Court or Superior Court may be taken by the State in the follow-
ing cases, and no other. Where judgment has been given for the
defendant-
1. Upon a special verdict.
2. Upon a demurrer.
3. Upon a motion to quash.
4. Upon arrest of judgment.
5. Upon a motion for a new trial on the ground of newly dis-
covered evidence, but only on questions of law.
6. Upon declaring a statute unconstitutional. 24
In these situations the State cannot alter facts to secure a con-
viction. On appeal from a sustained demurrer or motion to quash,
the case never has gone to trial on its merits; therefore, no facts have
been recorded. On special verdicts and arrests of judgment the
facts are decided by a jury and cannot be reviewed. Such appeals
as these include only questions of law.25 For this reason North
Carolina has, by section 15-179, expanded certain rights of the
State in an effort to secure judicial advantages.
A study of the cases interpreting the statute reveals that there
is some degree of uncertainty in both definition and application of
the statutory language. This uncertainty frequently results in er-
rors which might have been avoided if more specific provisions had
been formulated. In an attempt to clarify much of the confusion
caused by the absence of legislative definitions, the following interpre-
tations of the various subsections are offered along with discussions
of the important cases.
A. The Special Verdict
A special verdict28 is one in which the jury finds all the facts of
the case and refers the decision of the cause upon those facts to the
court.27 It is a verdict of guilty or not guilty since the facts found
(3) Upon a motion to quash;
(4) Upon arrest of judgment."'N.C. GEr. STAT. § 15-179 (1953).
"' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-179(5), is expressly limited to questions of law.
Section 15-179(6), would evade factual questions since the constitutionality
of a statute is implicitly a question of law.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-179(1) (1953), allows appeal by the State upon
a special verdict in favor of the defendant.
"See Mumford v. Wardwell, 73 U.S. 423 (1867). However, a special
verdict differs from findings in answer to interrogatories. A finding on
interrogatories need not cover all material issues and accompanies a general
verdict. A special verdict must cover all facts and is given in place of a
general verdict. State v. Hanner, 143 N.C. 632, 57 S.E. 154 (1907).
19641
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by the jury "do or do not constitute in the law the offenses
charged."28 A judgment on a special verdict, since it involves only
matters of law, is open to review at the instigation of either the
defendant or the State.
The special verdict has several advantages in criminal cases. It
simplifies the charge which the judge must give to the jury since
there is no need to relate the law to the facts and it partially eliminates
the element of sentiment in jury decisions-.29  It presumes the cor-
rect application of the law to the facts because this is done by the
judge. By allowing the State to appeal the defendant cannot be said
to be in double jeopardy.- The facts are found, recorded, and can-
not be altered. Only the application of the law by the judge may be
examined.
A special verdict is open to review by a higher court, but when
the judge sets aside a verdict, as may be done, he cannot on his own
motion enter a general verdict of guilty or not guilty. In State v:
Moore"0 the defendant was indicted for larceny of two barrels of
turpentine. After the presentation of the evidence the jury was
asked to return a special verdict. Instead it answered with two
interrogatories of its own: If the court found turpentine to be the
subject matter of larceny and if the court found the defendant did
steal two barrels, then it, the jury, found the defendant guilty., The
judge entered a verdict of not guilty and the State appealed upon
the questions raised in the "special verdict." The appellate court
refused to answer the questions on the ground that the jury verdict
had been set aside, the judge replacing it with his own. The verdict
was not given by the jury and therefore it was a nullity.
In Moore the court allowed the appeal for the purpose of recog-
nizing the error of law which the trial judge had committed.
The judge had made his own determination as to the proof of the
allegation of larceny of two barrels of turpentine. This determina-
tion caused the "verdict" to be of a different nature from the find-
ings of the jury. The judge's .verdict was general and therefore
2 State v. Moore, 29 N.C. 228, 230 (1847).
"It was once necessary that the judge, upon considering the finding of
fact by the jury, instruct them as to his application of the law and require
that the jury itself render the actual verdict upon his instructions. This is
no longer a necessity, even though it is still acceptable. It is now sufficient
if the trial judge simply hears the facts found by the jury and orders his
judgment entered on the record. For an excellent note on this and related
subjects see 13 N.C.L. REv. 321 (1935).
"29 N.C. 228 (1847).
[Vol. 42
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prohibited consideration of the legal questions on appeal by the
State. The court, however, realized that it was bound to act on the
appeal in some manner. It held that in such cases as these a mistrial
is to be declared and a venire de novo ordered in the court below.81
If the jury simply neglects to decide determinative facts and the
judge renders a special verdict in the proper form, the verdict is
ineffective, but the appeal is allowed on the question of law decided
by the judge. In State v. GulledgeO the defendant was found guilty
on "special verdict." The trial judge, on his own motion, ruled the
defendant not guilty. The State appealed on the theory that there
had been a special verdict. It was found that the facts determined
by the jury were insufficient to adjudicate either innocence or guilt.
Even though there could not have been a: binding verdict if the judge
had let the jury decision stand, the court held that the special verdict
would support an appeal by the State.3
Under section 15-179 the State may appeal to the superior court
from the various lower courts. Thus, the question arises whether
lower courts can render special verdicts. If 'the statute establishing
the lower court so specifies, special verdicts can be rendered.34  In
those courts where such authority is not granted in the establishing
act the power to issue special verdicts is undetermined. 35 If the
lower court had the authority to sit with a jury in criminal pro-
29 N.C. at 231.207 N.C. 374, 177 S.E. 128 (1934).
"This is not to say that where a judge sits without a jury he may call
his verdict a "special verdict" and thereby grant the State an appeal. Such
a verdict as this would be nothing more than an acquittal on a general verdict.
State v. Nichols, 215 N.C. 80, 200 S.E. 926 (1938). See also State v.
Mitchell, 225 N.C. 42, 33 S.E.2d 134 (1945), where the trial judge, upon
hearing the facts as determined by the jury, decided the applicable statute
was unconstitutional and ordered a "special verdict" on that ground. The
solicitor appealed on the theory that there had been a special verdict. The
appeal was not allowed on the ground that the constitutionality was a matter
which the judge could decide at any time; therefore, the verdict was not
based on the jury's findings, and no special verdict was given.
" State v. Mallett, 125 N.C. 718, 34 S.E. 651 (1899) ; State v. Bost, 125
N.C. 707, 34 S.E. 650 (1899).
" The supreme court announced its own uncertainty in State v. Everett,
244 N.C. 596, 94 S.E.2d 576 (1956), when it said: "Before the 1945 amend-
ment.., the State had no right of appeal to the Superior Court from the
judgment of an inferior court of competent jurisdiction given for the
defendant upon a special verdict.... The 1945 amendment implies that
there may be circumstances under which the State has such right of appeal.
Quaere: Unless the statute under which a recorder's court is established so
provides, may the judge of such court return a special verdict?" [Dismissed
on other grounds.] Id. at 597, 94 S.E.2d at 577.
19641
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ceedings, the implication is that there could be a special verdict
rendered. This implication is raised by both the history of special
verdicts in this State38 and the language of section 15-179 itself
which in no way limits the use of the special verdict. On the other
hand, if the inferior court is forbidden to use the jury, the judge
could not render a special verdict, and if he attempted to do so, the
judgment would be construed as a general verdict.
3 7
B. The Demurrer
Subsection 15-179(2) contemplates a common law demurrer
to the indictment.38 Such a demurrer admits the facts as stated in
the indictment but attacks their legal effect. 9  Consequently, it pre-
sents only questions of law which are appealable by the State.
40
On demurrer facts are never presented to the jury for consideration.
Any evidence taken on the demurrer is considered by the judge and
goes to the question of the validity of the trial to be had, not to the
guilt or innocence of the defendant.41
The State may appeal the sustaining of a demurrer, but the de-
fendant may not appeal if the demurrer is overruled. This is be-
cause sustaining such a demurrer amounts to a final judgment,
whereas if the demurrer of the defendant is overruled, it is in the
form of an interlocutory judgment which cannot be appealed.42
The defendant, however, may hold his exception, but he must pro-
ceed with the trial.
There is a possibility of confusion as to the breadth of the
appellate power given under subsection 15-179(2). Section 15-173
apparently provides for a motion called a "demurrer to the evi-
dence," 4 but this motion could not be within the purview of subsec-
tion 15-179(2). Historically, the State has never appealed after a
" Notice the use of the special verdict in Ahoskie v. Moye, 200 N.C. 11,
156 S.E. 130 (1930); State v. Crawford, 198 N.C. 522, 152 S.E. 504
(1930); State v. Corpening, 191 N.C. 751, 133 S.E. 14 (1926).
" See note 33 supra.
8 See note 44 infra and accompanying text.
" State v. Edwards, 190 N.C. 322, 130 S.E. 10 (1925)."O See State v. Harris, 106 N.C. 682, 11 S.E. 377 (1890).
41 State v. McDowell, 84 N.C. 798 (1881).
4' See State v. Blades, 209 N.C. 56, 182 S.E. 714 (1935) ; State v. Harris,
106 N.C. 682, 11 S.E. 377 (1890); State v. McDowell, 84 N.C. 798 (1881);
State v. Fishblate, 83 N.C. 654 (1880); State v. Bailey, 65 N.C. 426 (1871).
48 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-173 (1953) is entitled "Demurrer to the Evi-
dence" and provides, in part: "the defendant may move to dismiss the
action, or for judgment as in the case of nonsuit."
[Vol. 42
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demurrer to the evidence,44 but there is a more valid reason. Section
15-173 when originally enacted in 1913 was captioned by the
Assembly as "an act to provide for judgment of nonsuit in criminal
actions."45  The misnomer of "demurrer to the evidence" was in-
serted as a title to the section by the publisher in 1919 in the cone-
solidated statutes.46 When minor amendments were made in 1951
the Assembly again referred to the amendment as one to amend
the section relating to motions to dismiss or judgments of nonsuit
in criminal actions.41 The subtitle "demurrer to the evidence" which
had been entered by the publisher was merely carried over by the
legislature, obviously without realizing that it was perpetrating a
previous editorial error. The section itself makes no mention of a
demurrer to the evidence, but mentions only motions to dismiss and
nonsuits4 It is evident that the legislature did not mean to grant,
by section 15-173, any form of demurrer which would be within the
authority granted in section 15-179 (2).
Demurrers to the indictment usually attack the allegations on the
theory that they do not state facts sufficient to constitute a criminal
offense, and most of the reported cases in North Carolina were ap-
pealed from demurrers sustained on that ground.49  However, it is
entirely possible that an indictment may be defective for other
reasons. In State v. Harris"5 the defendant had demurred on the
ground that there were "several counts charging distinct offenses,
but of the same grade and punishable alike.", 1 This was apparently
"The only cases which have been appealed under N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15-179(2) are State v. Truitt, 239 N.C. 590, 80 S.E.2d 637 (1954); State
v. Stewart, 239 N.C. 589, 80 S.E.2d 636 (1954); State v. Felton, 239 N.C.
575, 80 S.E.2d 625 (1954); State v. Parker, 209 N.C. 32, 182 S.E. 723
(1935) ; State v. Morris, 208 N.C. 44, 179 S.E. 19 (1935) ; State v. Edwards,
190 N.C. 322, 130 S.E. 10 (1925); State v. Harris, 106 N.C. 682, 11 S.E.
377 (1890). These cases have all been appealed on common law demurrers
which were sustained. There has never been an appeal under N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15-179(2) on a "demurrer to the evidence" mentioned in the caption
to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-173 (1953).
" N.C. Sess. Laws 1913, ch. 73.
"N.C. CoNsoL. STATS. § 4643 (1919).
'7 N.C. Sess. Laws 1951, ch. 1086.
"See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-173 (1953).
"See State v. Truitt, 239 N.C. 590, 80 S.E.2d 637 (1954); State v.
Stewart, 239 N.C. 589, 80 S.E.2d 636 (1954); State v. Felton, 239 N.C. 575,
80 S.E.2d 625 (1954) ; State v. Parker, 209 N.C. 32, 182 S.E. 723 (1935) ;
State v. Morris, 208 N.C. 44, 179 S.E. 19 (1935); State v. Edwards, 190
N.C. 322,130 S.E. 10 (1925).
106 N.C. 682, 11 S.E. 377 (1890).106 N.C. at 687, 11 S.E. at 378.
19641
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a demurrer for misjoinder of criminal offenses even though the facts
alleged constituted the various crimes. The court held the demurrer
valid and allowed the State to appeal under subsection 15-179(2).
The trial judge may use his discretion in considering a demurrer,
but upon granting it he must leave the parties in their present situa-
tion. When a judge sustains a demurrer and returns a "verdict of
not guilty" thereon, the State may appeal upon a showing that the
"verdict" was, in fact, based on demurrer. "2 Thus, if the State
can procure another indictment, it has the right to do so.
C. The Motion to Quash
At common law the motion to quash was allowed against any in-
dictment insufficient on its face, 53 whether the insufficiency was
material or de minimus in form." In North Carolina the use of the
quashal is more restricted. There have been statutory modifications
which limit the right of the defendant to make a motion to quash so
that no quashal is allowed if "sufficient matter appears in the indict-
ment to enable the court to proceed to judgment."5 Also eliminated
is the requirement of legal words of art such as "with force of arms"
and "against the form of the statute."' 8
Most jurisdictions allow the motion to quash only where the
insufficiency is apparent on the face of the indictment. 7 North
Carolina, however, allows the defendant to make motions in those
cases where "relevant facts exist dehors the record" and can be
proven.58 It has been said that the trial court is allowed on its own
motion to require a quashal in those cases where it is apparent the
court has no authority."
"See State v. Parker, 209 N.C. 32, 182 S.E. 732 (1935), where the
defendant was the father of an illegitimate child born before the bastardy
act was passed. He was tried under the act. He demurred and the judge
held him not guilty. The State appealed. The court, on appeal, reversed
the trial judge even though "this could not be done upon a demurrer." Id.
at 33, 182 S.E. at 733.
" CLARK, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 416-21 (1918).
" People v. Cooper, 366 Ill. 113, 7 N.E.2d 882 (1937).
" See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-153 (1953).
" See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-155 (1953).
'¢ See Clark, op. cit. supra note 53, at 416-21 (1918).
"State v. Bowman, 145 N.C. 452, 455, 59 S.E. 74, 76 (1907): "While
it is held in many jurisdictions that a motion to quash can only be made for
matter apparent in the record... it is otherwise with us. And a plea of the
kind interposed here has been sanctioned as a proper method, in motions
to quash, by which the relevant facts exist dehors the record should be made
to appear."
" The court explained the duties of the lower courts in State v. Miller,
[Vol. 42
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The motion to quash is, in form, a motion and not a plea and
it should be allowed for all material errors surrounding the pro-
ceedings. Some of the reasons for which indictments have been
quashed in North Carolina and which have supported appeal by the
State are: unconstitutionality of the statute on which the indictment
was drawn ° and "no evidence" on which the grand jury could find
an indictment. 61
There have been several cases that have taxed the court's ability
to define quashal for the purpose of the State's appeal, due to the
fact that North Carolina allows facts dehors the record in such
cases.6 2 The "dehors rule," since it allows an introduction of facts,
seems to produce difficulty in deciding when double jeopardy is in-
volved in quashal decisions. In State v. Bowman6 3 the State ap-
pealed a judgment for the defendant which had been granted on a
plea of statutory immunity. The defendant contended that the
State had no right to appeal under the immunity statute. The court
answered that for "the purpose of the appeal," the defendant's plea
should be considered as a motion to quash and brought within the
provisions of subsection 15-179 (3).64 The court reached a different
result, however, in State v. Wilson6 5 where the prisoner pleaded that
the indictment was issued for an offense for which he had previously
been tried. The trial judge allowed the "motion to quash" and
100 N.C. 543, 5 S.E. 925 (1888), where it said: "Generally and ordinarily,
a motion to quash the indictment made by the defendant, should not be
allowed, if made after the plea of not guilty, but such motion, on the part
of the State, may be allowed at any time before the defendant has been
actually tried upon the indictment. It seems, however, that the court has
authority, to be exercised in its discretion, to allow the motion to be made
by the defendant after his plea of not guilty, and there are cases in which
such motion should be allowed at any time, as when it appears from the
indictment that the court has no jurisdiction. This objection may, be taken
by mere suggestion, or by motion, or the Court may ex mero motu, take notice
of it. Neither consent nor waiver can give jurisdiction, and the court will not
proceed when it appears from the record that it has no authority." Id. at
545, 5 S.E. at 926.
"See State v. Wilkes, 233 N.C. 645, 65 S.E.2d 129 (1951), where the
statute authorizing a fine for violation of parking meters was contested,
but no decision was made on the validity of the act since the action was
brought in the superior court which did not have jurisdiction. See also
State v. Hales, 256 N.C. 27, 122 S.E.2d 768 (1961).
" State v. Barnes, 52 N.C. 20 (1859).
"E.g., State v. Wilson, 234 N.C. 552, 67 S.E.2d 748 (1951); State v.
Bowman, 145 N.C. 452, 59 S.E. 74 (1907).
"145 N.C. 452, 59 S.E. 74 (1907).
"145 N.C. at 455, 59 S.E. at 75.
"234 N.C. 552, 67 S.E.2d 748 (1951).
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released the prisoner. The State appealed. The supreme court
refused to hear the appeal on the ground that this was not a granting
of a motion to quash but was a plea of autrefois acquit.
There is a legal distinction between the defenses used in Bowman
and Wilson. The accused is claiming prior jeopardy if his defense
rests on autrefois acquit, while a plea of immunity supports no such
allegation. However, the differentiation of these defenses for the
purpose of subsection 15-179(3) is not convincing. In both Bow-
man and Wilson the court allowed evidence dehors the record. These
"outside" facts do not go to the merits of the defendant's case and
cannot raise the issue of jeopardy. They deal with the validity of
the proposed trial. Both motions attempt to avoid the entire trial,
not the allegations in the indictment.66 If the plea of prior acquittal
is denied on appeal, then it becomes a legal conclusion that a con-
tinuation of the present proceedings would not constitute double
jeopardy. A review of the plea of immunity would involve the legal
construction of the immunity statute and not extraneous facts.
Consequently, both these defenses, pleaded in bar to the entire pro-
ceedings or in abatement of the indictment on extraneous facts,
should be included under motions to quash. 7
The court has, on occasion, shown leniency in its consideration
of quashals. In the case of State v. Wilkes6 the defendant was tried
for parking meter violations. He made a motion to quash on the
ground that the statute was unconstitutional. The motion was
sustained. On appeal by the State, the court avoided the question of
the statute's constitutionality and held instead that the trial court
had lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. Consequently, the quashal
was allowed to stand even though the question of jurisdiction had
not been raised by the defendant's motion in the trial court. Thus,
while the State may appeal the granting of the motion and have its
contentions sustained, it may nevertheless lose the case if another
ground can be found on which the quashal could have been based.
The effect is that the State must not only prepare an appellate brief
on the specific grounds used in the lower court, but on any grounds
which should have been pleaded by the defendant.
" State v. Cooke, 248 N.C. 485, 103 S.E.2d 846 (1958).
" State v. Pararore, 146 N.C. 604, 60 S.E. 502 (1908).
233 N.C. 645, 65 S.E.2d 129 (1951).
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D. The Arrest of Judgment
A motion in arrest of judgment is one made after verdict to
prevent entry of judgment. 9 It is based upon an insufficiency in
the indictment or a fatal defect appearing on the face of the record.7"
Oddly, North Carolina allows facts dehors the record to promote
quashals, 7' but does not allow them when a motion in arrest of
judgment is made.72 It is true that in the case of quashals the in-
sufficiency of the indictment to support a verdict is recognized
either before or during the trial, while in motions to arrest this in-
sufficiency is noted after a verdict has been rendered; however, this
distinction does not seem meaningful, and the legal effect of both
is the same.73
The constitutionality of a criminal statute may be questioned by
several methods during a trial. The demurrer,74 the motion to
quash,71 and the motion to arrest judgment78 are all available for
this purpose. It may be desirable, however, for a trial judge to
postpone decisions on constitutional issues until all the evidence has
been presented and the jury has returned a verdict. If the jury finds
the defendant guilty and the judge allows a motion to arrest because
of the constitutional question and is reversed on appeal, there would
be no need for a new trial.
The case of State v. McCollum77 poses an interesting problem
in the use of the motion to arrest. The defendant was convicted of
manslaughter and was ordered to pay the mother of his victim the
sum of six dollars per week for five years. The mother passed away
within a year, and the defendant petitioned the court to be relieved
" Appeal was allowed in State v. Hall, 183 N.C. 806, 112 S.E. 431 (1922),
though the court noted the following insufficiency: "It was not correct to
charge the jury that both parties could not be guilty of manslaughter, and the
jury having convicted both, it was in the power of the court to have set aside
the verdict as to Haney, but it did not do so. On the contrary, the record
states that he arrested the judgment upon the verdict as to Haney as a matter
of law and the State, under the statute, had the right to appeal. C.S.,
4649(4) provides that the State may appeal 'where judgment is given for
the defendant upon arrest of judgment.'" Id. at 813, 112 S.E. at 435.
70 State v. McCollum, 216 N.C. 737, 739, 6 S.E.2d 503, 504 (1940).
71 See Part IL C, supra.
72 State v. Walker, 87 N.C. 541 (1882).
" Both are based on the premise that the judgment cannot lie because of
some legal defect. It ought to be unimportant whether these defects are
apparent on the record 6r dehors the record.
' State v. Glidden Co., 228 N.C. 664, 46 S.E.2d 860 (1948).
State v. Wilkes, 233 N.C. 645, 65 S.E.2d 129 (1951).
' State v. Hall, 183 N.C. 806, 112 S.E. 431 (1922).
216 N.C. 737, 6 S.E.2d 503 (1940).
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of further payments, whereupon the victim's father asked to have
them continued. The judge authorized the discontinuance of further
payments and the State appealed on the basis that there had been
an "arrest of judgment" since the payments were halted. The
supreme court denied the State's appeal on the ground that this was
not an arrest of judgment of "ordinary legal significance, '78 and
that therefore the appeal could not lie under subsection 15-179(4).
In refusing the appeal of the State, the court failed to mention any
right of the father to appeal. Although the father was not asking
review he should have such a right in these cases.70  The interven-
tion of the father should be construed to change the character of the
criminal action to that of a civil suit for enforcement of a money
judgment and such controversies are appealable by the intervenor.
E. The Motion for a New Trial on Newly Discovered Evidence-
The Constitutionality of a Statute
Subsections 15-179(5) and (6) were enacted in 1945" to over-
rule two cases which had been decided by the North Carolina Su-
preme Court, and it is necessary to examine the holding and effect
of the individual decisions in order to determine their intended scope.
Prior to 1945 neither the defendant nor the State could appeal
from the ruling of the judge on a motion to grant a new trial on the
ground of newly discovered evidence.8 2 This determination by the
judge was considered to involve no matter of law or legal inference.
83
It was reasoned that the State had obtained its conviction and that
if the defendant wanted to reopen the issues, it was within the
76216 N.C. at 739, 6 S.E.2d at 504.
' The court at one point infers such a right when it distinguishes the
State's argument by stating: "The cases cited by appellant [State] are not
in point. In S. v. Beatty, 66 N.C., 648, a bastardy case under the law then
in force, the appeal was taken by the relator; and in S. v. Parsons, 115 N.C.,
730, 20 S.E., 511, another bastardy case, the prosecutrix appealed." 216
N.C. at 739, 6 S.E.2d at 504.
" Decisions from all civil suits between private parties are appealable
since double jeopar-ty does not apply to civil actions. State v. Watson, 209
N.C. 229, 231, 183 S.E. 286, 287 (1936).
61 N.C. Sess. Laws 1945, ch. 701.
6" State v. Moore, 202 N.C. 841, 163 S.E. 700 (1932); State v. Griffin,
202 N.C. 517, 163 S.E. 457 (1932); State v. Cox, 202 N.C. 378, 162 S.E.
907 (1932),8' Griffin and Cox both held that the granting or denial of a motion for
new trial on new evidence was in the trial judge's discretion. Griffin went
further and said that the reason such action was not appealable was because




judge's discretion to let him do so. 4 The judge's order allowing
the motion, when made in a criminal action, is conclusive on the
State.85 The epitomy of this logic was brought out in State v.
Todd.s  The defendant had been convicted of murder and asked
for a new trial to consider newly discovered evidence. The judge
allowed the motion and the State appealed 7 on the question of
whether the evidence which defendant presented was within the
legal definition of "newly discovered evidence."" The court in
refusing to consider the appeal said issues of this type were within
the "and no other" part of section 15-179 and thereby prohibited. 9
State v. Todd precipitated the enactment of subsection 15-
179 (5) 90 which allows appeal by the State on a motion for a new trial
by the defendant. There is little need to refuse the State such a
right in these cases. The questions presented on motions for new
trial on new evidence do not of themselves involve double jeopardy.
The questions on such motion go only to the character of the "new
evidence." The holding in Todd refusing the appeal subjected the
State to the rigors of a new trial when there were valid legal
questions concerning the validity of the new evidence. The court
missed the opportunity to clarify legal issues which might have
reduced future litigation.
On the motions for new trial it is the defendant, not the solicitor,
who is asking for another trial on the merits of his new evidence.
64 State v. Griffin, 202 N.C. 517, 518, 163 S.E. 457 (1932).
8 State v. Cox, 202 N.C. 378, 380, 162 S.E. 907, 909 (1932).
224 N.C. 776, 32 S.E.2d 313 (1944).
8, The State also sought certiorari. In refusing to consider the case the
court refused to grant certiorari in its supervisory capacity. Note that
certiorari is implicitly limited to those cases where the State could have
appealed, but the right of appeal has been lost in some way.
" In State v. Casey, 201 N.C. 620, 161 S.E. 81 (1931), the court outlined
the prerequisites to the granting of new trials on newly discovered evidence.
It was held that it must appear: "1. That the witness or witnesses will give
the newly discovered evidence.... 2. That such newly discovered evidence
is probably true.... 3. That it is competent, material and relevant.... 4.
That due diligence was used and proper means were employed to procure
the testimony at trial.... 5. That the newly discovered evidence is not
merely cumulative... 6. That it does not tend only to contradict a former
witness or to impeach or discredit him.... 7. That it is of such a nature
as to show that on another trial a different result will probably be reached
and that the right will prevail." Id. at 624-25, 161 S.E. at 83-84.
It was also stated in Casey that new trials on newly discovered evidence
could only be granted in the superior court and never in the supreme court
in criminal cases. Id. at 625, 161 S.E. at 84.89 State v. Todd, 224 N.C. 776, 777, 32 S.E.2d 313 (1944).
o N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-179(5) (1953).
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If the defendant has valid evidence it would be logical to grant his
motion; however, if such evidence is legally invalid it could do him
no harm to have the State appeal on that issue prior to the proposed
new trial.
The right of appeal from judgments declaring a statute un-
constitutional has a different history. Defendants had always had
the power to contest the validity of statutes in many ways. Statutes
had been tested by demurrer, quashals and arrests of judgment.01
All of these methods were in use prior to 1945, and an appeal by the
State was allowed in every case.92  But in 1945 a constitutional
question was presented in the case of State v. Mitchell. 3 The de-
fendant was indicted for practicing palmistry. His defense was the
invalidity of the act under which he was being tried. The jury
returned a "special verdict" holding the defendant not guilty because
the statute was prohibited by the constitution." The State appealed
the verdict on the theory that it was returned on the special verdict.
The supreme court, however, found the verdict was based, not on
the facts found, but on the judge's conclusion that the statute was
invalid. The court reasoned that the judge could rule on statutory
validity at any time during the trial; therefore, the special verdict,
as such, was without effect.95 With the statutory ground for appeal,
the special verdict, eliminated the court held that there was nothing
on which the State could support its appeal, and it was dismissed.
The Mitchell case was apparently the first decision which refused
appeal by the State where a statute had been declared invalid." This
prompted the legislature to enact subsection 15-179(6)OT granting
appeal in all such cases. Appeals on statutory validity are now al-
"' See notes 74, 75, 76 supra.
"E.g., Ahoskie v. Moye, 200 N.C. 11, 156 S.E. 130 (1930); State v.
Yarboro, 194 N.C. 498, 140 S.E. 216 (1927); State v. Corpening, 191 N.C.
751, 133 S.E. 14 (1926); State v. Jones, 191 N.C. 371, 131 S.E. 734 (1926).
- 225 N.C. 42, 33 S.E.2d 134 (1945).
",N.C. CoNsT. art. II, § 29.
95 225 N.C. at 42, 33 S.E.2d at 134-35.
"The decision of the court in Mitchell was faulty in that it went only
halfway. The court correctly recognized that the judge had ruled on his
own motion to determine the validity of the act. The court, however, failed
to recognize that this motion must have had some nature of its own, even
though made by the judge. It must have had some substantive basis such as
an arrest of judgment (as apparently used in Mitchell) or quashal. Testing
constitutionality is only the object of the motion, it is not in itself a motion.
Using this logic the court could have brought the State's right to appeal
within N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-179, as it then stood.
"IN.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-179(6) (1953).
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lowed indirectly under most subsections of section 15-17995 and
specifically by subsection 15-179(6). The problem of appellate
authority present in Todd is no longer a consideration. 9
III. CERTIORARI
The North Carolina Constitution grants the supreme court the
"power to issue any remedial writs necessary to give it a general
supervision and control over the proceedings of the other courts."' °
The power to use remedial writs, such as the writ of certiorari, in
any type of lower court action has presented problems as it applies
to the State's power to appeal. If certiorari can be used by the State
when it does not have a right of appeal, its use would be in derogation
of section 15-179. If the use of a writ of certiorari is allowed only
where the State has lost its appellate power it could be regarded as
detrimental to the defendant. Yet, the authority for the use of the
writ is stated in the constitution and it must have some accepted
application.
This conflict was realized early in our judicial history. In State
v. SwepsonY" the trial judge refused to amend the record to show
that the State had not waived the appearance of the defendant at
trial. The State asked for a writ of certiorari to have the record
amended. The North Carolina Supreme Court granted a writ
0 2
on the theory that it was within the supervisory powers of the court
to amend the record when the trial judge had abused his discretion.
However, the court recognized the possibility that the State might
avoid statutory limitations if the writ was available without limita-
tion and in order to narrow its use the court laid down basic guide-
lines.0 3 The supreme court reserved the right to issue any remedial
writs in exercising its supervisory power, but limited itself in grant-
ing certiorari to the State in the following language: "[T]he right
[of appeal] in the case of the State is... restricted... to errors of
law on the face of judgments adverse to the State, on demurrer to
the indictment, or on motion to quash or in arrest, or on a special
' See State v. Hales, 256 N.C. 27, 122 S.E.2d 768 (1961) ; State v. Wilkes,
233 N.C. 645, 65 S.E.2d 129 (1951); State v. Glidden Co., 228 N.C.
664, 46 S.E.2d 860 (1948).
"But see State v. Wilkes, 233 N. C. 645, 65 S.E.2d 129 (1951)." N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 8.
1-0 83 N.C. 584 (1880).
10' In Swepson the court granted a writ of error, but took the opportunity
to outline the limits within which a writ of certiorari could be granted.
10 83 N.C. at 586.
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verdict.... And in case of appeal lost without laches... the State
in the instances aforesaid, may have a writ of certiorari... as a
substitute for an appeal."'' 4 Thus, the State can obtain certiorari
only in those cases in which it has previously had a right of appeal
and has lost that right without laches.
There was no indication in Swepson that writs of certiorari
could only be granted where the error was apparent on the face of
the record. Indeed, in that case, the error complained of was that
certain information had been omitted from the record. But in
State v. Todd,-0 5 it is stated that the error must appear on the trial
record in order to be corrected by the court on certiorari.
The use of the writ of certiorari is well established in North
Carolina. However, a change would be in order to put the law into
perspective. The language of the constitution grants the court a
complete power to issue any remedial writ in its supervisory ca-
pacity.' O8 The court, on its own motion, as seen from the above
discussion, has undertaken to limit the use of this power. Neverthe-
less, the power of the'court to grant unlimited review through the
use of supervisory writs remains and can only be irrevocably limited
by an amendment.
10 7
IV. THE GENERAL VERDICT
A general verdict may be rendered by a judge or a jury, upon
consideration of the facts and law presented at trial.' When the
accused has been tried and acquitted on a general verdict the result
is final and conclusive, and no appeal is allowed the State.1°0 These
findings are not appealable because the verdict declares that the facts
essential to establish the defendant's guilt were not proven on the
merits of the evidence. An appeal on a general verdict would neces-
sarily put before the appellate court questions of fact. If the court
20' Ibid.
"0 224 N.C. 776, 777, 32 S.E.2d 313, 314 (1944).
"'0N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 10.
'" 7An amendment would not be necessary for the supreme court to grant
review in those cases where the error does not appear on the record. Under
the power to issue any supervisory writs, the court could review errors on as
well as dehors the record. See N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 10.
10. Some jurisdictions have held that only a jury can render a general
verdict. See Fisher v. Drew, 247 Mass. 178, 141 N.E. 875 (1924). But
North Carolina has held that a judge sitting without a jury can render only
a general verdict. State v. Nichols, 215 N.C. 80, 200 S.E.2d 926 (1939).
In comparison, a special verdict rests on a finding by the jury of facts only.
See note 27 supra.E.g., State v. Powell, 86 N.C. 640 (1882).
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were allowed to review general verdicts, it would have the ability to
redetermine factual issues. This would put the accused in double
jeopardy.
If there has not been a general verdict, there may be a right of
appeal under section 15-179." ° In order to bar the appeal it must be
determined that there has in fact been a general verdict and that the
verdict constituted an acquittal. The verdict, to be general, should
be given by a body which has considered the issues of both law and
fact. The acquittal which is rendered must be a finding of not
guilty and must rest on the merits.1
The rule that the State cannot appeal from general verdicts
has been stated in many North Carolina decisions. 12 The leading
case is State v. Savery"3 which involved issues dealing with a
"general verdict" on a warrant charging a misdemeanor. In Savery
the jury was impaneled and the first witness sworn. This witness
was the prosecutor who testified that even though the warrant did
not contain an affidavit, he was the witness who was mentioned there-
in. On realizing the warrant contained no affidavit the defendant
moved for a "verdict of not guilty." The State asked that the case
be heard on its merits or that the warrant be dismissed with leave to
the State to retry the defendant. The judge denied the State's
objection and instructed the jury to return a verdict of not guilty for
the defendant. From this verdict the State appealed.
On appeal the majority were of the opinion that a general verdict
had been entered and there could be no appeal. Their opinion turned
on three essential issues. First, the court found that the rule of
110 The statute is a restrictive statute. This created an innocuous situation
in the early days of its enactment. The supreme court had said that since
the statute granted an appeal only to that court, the State could only appeal
from a lower court to the superior courts in those circumstances in which it
was specifically provided by the act creating the lower courts. State v. Bost,
125 N.C. 707, 34 S.E. 650 (1899). The act establishing the eastern district
courts allowed appeal to the superior courts but such power was inadvertently
omitted from the act creating the western district courts. State v. Mallette,
125 N.C. 718, 34 S.E. 651 (1899). This oddity was later removed by adding
the words "or Superior court" to the statute thereby bringing almost all
State appeals within the statute. See State v. Savery, 126 N.C. 1083, 36
S.E. 22 (1900).
...An acquittal in fact can never be rendered except upon the jury
verdict of not guilty. Acquittals in law are those which occur by operation
of law. State v. Walton, 186 N.C. 485, 119 S.E. 886 (1923).
.. E.g., State v. Moore, 84 N.C. 724 (1881); State v. Lane, 78 N.C. 547
(1878) ; State v. Taylor, 8 N.C. 462 (1821).
126 N.C. 1083, 36 S.E. 22 (1900).
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double jeopardy might apply in cases other than capital felonies. 4
Second, if double jeopardy was in issue, the impaneling of the jury
constituted primary jeopardy and any review would violate de-
fendant's constitutional rights."' Finally the court found that if
double jeopardy was not an issue there was no authority for setting
aside a general verdict of not guilty.
Two justices dissented." 6 Their reasoning avoided the issues
presented by the majority. Justice Montgomery, writing for the
dissent, surmised that there had not been a general verdict but rather
a quashal.17  He recognized that an acquittal, to be final and con-
clusive, must be had on a trial upon the merits of the case." 8 Since
the State had requested that the merits be presented and this request
had been refused because the warrant was not supported by an
affidavit, the action of the judge was in legal effect a quashal. Ap-
peals from quashals are allowed under subsection three of section
15-179.
The effect of the Savery decision is to allow the trial judge to
deny an appeal to the State by the simple use of terminology. By
making a ruling on the validity of an indictment and by calling that
ruling a general verdict the State is foreclosed from its appellate
power. In Savery the judge's attention was called to the indictment
not by defense counsel's motion to quash or to arrest judgment, but
by evidence submitted on trial by the prosecuting witness. Regard-
less of how the court became aware of the defective warrant the
legal effect of striking down that warrant should not be altered.
V. EXCEPTIONS TO N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-179
There are several holdings which are of importance in a con-
sideration of section 15-179. Some of these rightly come under the
heading of "exceptions" because of their peculiar effect; others are
merely inconsistencies. An understanding of these cases, however,
aids in defining the area within which section 15-179 has effect.
1 126 N.C. at 1086, 36 S.E. at 23.
1r 126 N.C. at 1086-87, 36 S.E. at 23.
... 126 N.C. at 1091, 36 S.E. at 25.
117 126 N.C. at 1092-93, 36 S.E. at 25.
"8 The conclusions of the dissent in Savery present the more accurate
view of the facts. The trial judge refused to hear evidence on the premise
that the indictment would not support a finding by the jury. It is difficult
to see how such a warrant could support a "general verdict of acquittal."
If the jury cannot return a verdict on the warrant and evidence, it cannot




The authority of section 15-179 has been challenged in a series
of decisions which defy explanation.119 In these cases the court has
recognized that there was no right of appeal on behalf of the State.
Then it has proceeded, either on its own motion or on request of
counsel, to discuss the issues involved and to make judicial decisions
which affect the rights of the accused.2 0 In these cases the possi-
bility of double jeopardy is a live issue, and the court has allowed the
defendant to be retried without deciding it. To continue this prac-
tice in the shadow of a statute1 21 which expressly prohibits such
activities is to circumvent the statute and give judicial sanction to
double jeopardy.
There are other cases which give the statute an effect in contrast
to some interpretations.2 The constitution provides that in a
justice's court "the party against whom the judgment is given may
appeal to the Superior Court, where the matter shall be heard
anew.'=m This language appears to give both the State and the ac-
cused the power to appeal, but the court has held that only the accused
may appeal. 24 Though obviously limiting the language of the
constitution, the decisions are based on sound reasoning. If the
State appeals from an adverse verdict on the facts and has the matter
heard de novo, it is putting the accused in double jeopardy. How-
ever, the clause should not be construed in a manner which limits all
119 See State v. Burnett, 173 N.C. 750, 91 S.E. 597 (1917); State v.
Branner, 149 N.C. 559, 63 S.E. 169 (1908); State v. Davidson, 124 N.C.
839, 32 S.E. 957 (1899) ; State v. Hinson, 123 N.C. 755, 31 S.E. 854 (1898);
State v. Lane, 78 N.C. 547 (1878).
1"' E.g., State v. Burnett, 173 N.C. 750, 91 S.E. 597 (1917), where the
court determined that there was no right of appeal but proceeded to answer
the question presented since it was important to the due administration of
law in the county courts and it was specially requested by counsel. The
question in cases of this sort is: What dispositions and actions can be taken
with regard to the decision on the "unappealable issue"? See State v.
Branner, 149 N.C. 559, 63 S.E. 169 (1908), where the court stated: "The
real difficulty present in the case here is whether the State had the right to
appeal. We think not. The statute now regulates this matter .... While,
therefore, error appears in the proceedings below, we cannot reverse the
action of the court, as we have no jurisdiction, by reason of the statute, to
do so, but we have considered the merits of the case to some extent, as they
were fully discussed before us and we were asked do so." Id. at 564, 63
S.E. at 171....The statute referred to is N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-179 (1953).
"2 E.g., State v. Powell, 86 N.C. 640 (1882).
.2 N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 27.
12. See State v. Powell, 86 N.C. 640 (1882), which nullifies the constitu-
tional argument but goes on to say when part of a criminal judgment is
personal to the prosecuting witness and taxes him with costs, he may appeal
since the proceeding assumes the character of a civil controversy.
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appeals by the State, but only those which would prejudice the de-
fendant. An appeal on questions of law should be allowed. The
clear language of the constitution should prevail over the statute
which allows appeal in certain cases "and no other."' 25
Other decisions have influenced the interpretation of the statute
as it applies to "criminal" actions. 126 Double jeopardy applies only
in the criminal courts .2 Therefore, only actions brought under
criminal statutes are controlled by section 15-179. However, civil
statutes are also within the purview of section 15-179 if they pre-
scribe criminal punishments. 28 In such cases neither the State, if
it is a party, nor a plaintiff who is a private citizen may appeal an
adverse decision. It was held that to allow such appeal would con-
stitute double jeopardy.2 9
VI. CONCLUSION
The rights of the citizen and the State are actually two sides of
the same coin. The citizen has the right not to be persecuted or
convicted if he is not guilty of a criminal offense against the State.
The State has the right and duty to convict and punish those indi-
viduals who are guilty of criminal offenses. The major considera-
tion is the balancing of these rights on an equitable basis so that the
rights of the State and its citizens may be preserved. As was pointed
out earlier, various approaches have been taken in this balancing
...N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-179 (1953) provides: "An appeal... may be
taken by the State in the following cases, and no other...."
... E.g., State v. Ivie, 118 N.C. 1227, 24 S.E. 539 (1896) ; State v. Ostwalt,
118 N.C. 1208, 24 S.E. 660 (1896). See State v. Cox, 215 N.C. 458, 2 S.E.2d
370, aff'd 216 N.C. 424, 5 S.E.2d 125 (1939), where the defendant was tried
in the county court for illegal possession of gambling devices, he was found
guilty and served notice of appeal. The judge said that he would change the
judgment if the defendant would withdraw his appeal to the superior court;
this the defendant did. The superior court judge then said that either the
State or the defendant could appeal after the lower court granted a nwlo
contendere. The State appealed. The supreme court held that the superior
court judge could not enlarge the right of the State to appeal.State v. Watson, 209 N.C. 229, 183 S.E. 286 (1936).
12 State v. Ostwalt, 118 N.C. 1208, 24 S.E. 660 (1896). The defendant
was charged under the bastardy act which required that a fine be assessed.
The defendant was found not guilty and the mother appealed. The court
held that to allow the appeal would be to put the defendant in "double
jeopardy." Id. at 1216, 24 S.E. at 663. Thus the civil offense was converted
via the fine provision to a criminal offense. But see State v. Ivie, 118 N.C.
1227, 24 S.E. 539 (1896), where facts were the same but the lower court
had exceeded its jurisdiction in hearing the case and the appeal was allowed
to both the State and the prosecutrix."' See State v. Ostwalt, 118 N.C. 1208, 24 S.E. 660 (1896).
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process.180 Some jurisdictions have emphasized the citizen's right to
protection while others have given a free rein to the State to appeal
criminal cases.' 31 Many jurisdictions have derogated the common
law and have allowed some appeal by the State.'32 Just where that
appellate power should cease has been another question.
Perhaps the best approach to the problem is to allow appeals by
the State on all questions of law. 3 3 The law is the basis of our
society. It should contemplate its own best interest by providing
appeals which would help to clarify and protect it. If questions of
law are neglected when it could be to no one's harm to have them
answered, society as a whole is put at a disadvantage. Not only may
guilty individuals escape punishment but the citizenry must ride a
crest of consequential errors promulgated in the court system.
Appeals by the State on questions of law would by definition
exclude appeals from general verdicts. It would eliminate the
necessity for distinctions between special verdicts, demurrers, con-
stitutional questions and quashals. The courts could deal with legal
problems and avoid the formal distinctions. Such a practice would
pay dividends in efficient appellate procedure, definitive answers to
legal questions, and swifter and surer justice for all.
ARNOLD T. WooD
Constitutional Law-Cruel and Unusual-Capital Punishment
The Supreme Court of the United States recently denied certio-
rari to consider whether the eighth amendment prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment1 prohibits the imposition of the death
penalty on a convicted rapist.2 However, Justice Goldberg, joined
by Justices Douglas and Brennan, dissented and favored granting
.. See notes 9-10 supra and accompanying text.
... Ibid. Various states have adopted differing approaches between the
extremes of no appellate power in the State and unlimited appellate power.
E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 15, § 370 (1940) (Recomp. 1958), allowing appeals by
the State only when statutes are declared unconstitutional.
.g., ALA. CODE tit. 15, § 370 (1940) (Recomp. 1958) ; CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 54-96 (1958) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-179 (1953).
... Our own court has questioned such an omission from N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15-179. See State v. Todd, 224 N.C. 776, 32 S.E.2d 313 (1944); State v.
Davidson, 124 N.C. 839, 32 S.E. 957 (1899).
'"Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.' Rudolph v. Alabama, 32 U.S.L. WEEK 3154 (U.S. Oct. 22, 1963).
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